Brexit, the Irish border and social security rights by McKeever, Grainne
 1 
Brexit, the Irish border and social security rights 
 
Gráinne McKeever 
 
Abstract: 
This paper will examine the implications of Brexit for social security rights as they affect 
Northern Ireland. The paper begins with a consideration of the UK-wide implications for social 
security arising from Brexit including the potential impact on rights derived from EU law and 
the legal challenges inherent in reconciling existing EU laws with new domestic UK legislation, 
with concerns over the potential for parliamentary or independent scrutiny of this process. 
The general constitutional and political uncertainties for Northern Ireland arising from Brexit 
are considered in order to contextualise the examination of the most prominent social security 
implications for Northern Ireland – and the Republic of Ireland – stemming from the issue of 
cross-border working and the aggregation and exportability of social security entitlements. 
The paper brings together the positions of the UK, Northern Ireland, Republic of Ireland and 
the EU, as of January 2018, to provide a robust assessment of the cumulative issues that that 
will impact on social security rights in Northern Ireland post-Brexit. 
 
Introduction 
 
At the outset of the European Union’s (EU) preparations for discussions with the United 
Kingdom (UK) Government about exiting the EU (Brexit) it was agreed that ‘the border 
question’ would be one of the three priorities to be resolved before full negotiations could 
begin.1 This prioritised focus is on the open, seamless border that currently exists between 
the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland that enables the free movement of people, 
goods and services across Ireland and the UK. The open border has been the product of 
twenty years of continuing peace negotiations to remove the hard border that existed 
previously, which was heavily policed and controlled as part of the security arrangements 
arising from the conflict in Northern Ireland. The implications of Brexit for Northern Ireland 
have, understandably, focused on the need to ensure that post-Brexit border arrangements 
do not disturb the existing fragile political equilibrium in Northern Ireland, which itself is 
supported by the ability to move trade and people freely within the island of Ireland. The 
principle of a soft, seamless border has been the agreed preference of the UK, Northern 
Ireland and Irish governments, with the support of the EU, but no substantive practical 
solution has yet been devised, much less agreed, to implement this principle.  
 
Much further down the Brexit planning list has been the social security implications for 
individuals north and south of the border in Ireland, which replicate the general UK-wide 
implications for social security arising from Brexit, and then layer additional complexities 
relating to cross-border workers and access to services. This article aims to highlight some of 
the detailed implications that seem likely to arise for social security arrangements in Northern 
Ireland and Ireland post-Brexit, an issue that has received minimal attention but which has 
the potential to impact significantly on social security claimants. The paper begins with a brief 
                                                      
1 European Council (2017) Guidelines following the UK’s notification under Article 50 TEU, 
EUCO XT 2004/17, 29 April 2017 
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overview of the post-Brexit implications for social security across the UK, which concern the 
potential impact on social security entitlement and the transposition of EU law into domestic 
legislation, echoing the detailed analysis by Neville Harris in this edition. It then considers the 
political and constitutional implications of Brexit for Northern Ireland, before examining the 
concerns around exporting and aggregating social security entitlements. Finally, it examines 
the very specific issues relating to cross-border working and accessing services between 
Northern Ireland and Ireland. In conclusion, it assesses the gaps remaining for social security 
claimants within the joint position that has been reached by all parties, reinforcing the 
likelihood that the obscure, technical provisions of social security entitlement, including those 
supported by EU law, will get overlooked or left behind post-Brexit.  
 
 
EU impact on UK social security law 
 
There are three main areas where the Brexit impact on UK social security can be anticipated: 
the influence of fundamental principles of EU law, the conditions under which non-UK 
nationals can work and claim benefits in the UK, and the legislative process to transpose EU 
law into domestic provisions. 
 
Principles 
UK social security law has been shaped less by detailed EU governance and more by 
fundamental EU principles such as free movement, equal treatment and sex discrimination.2 
While the EU has not driven much of the detail of social security legislation in the UK, as Harris 
makes clear there will still be a post-Brexit impact on social security and there are concerns 
about the potential loss of rights derived from EU law and the loss of future progressive 
change that the EU may implement.3 The implementation of EU Directive Directive 79/7 
requiring the sexes to be treated equally for social security purposes, for example, has been 
described by Masselot et al as:  
 
“[playing] an influential role in shaping the UK statutory social security system. It 
resulted in the removal of various forms of discrimination in order to ensure a 
progressive move towards gender equality.”4  
 
Of course, future change may not be progressive and it is important to note the EU’s more 
regressive approach to social security in recent years under the jurisprudence of the CJEU, 
which Babayev argues has narrowed the social protection open to EU citizens seeking welfare 
support in other Member States. He charts the “emancipation of [Union] rights from their 
                                                      
2 See D Birrell and AM Gray, “Devolution: The Social, Political and Policy Implications of Brexit 
for Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland” (2017) Journal of Social Policy 46(4), 765-782 for a 
discussion of the EU’s focus on social policy more generally. 
3 Neville Harris, “Welfare rights, austerity and the decision to leave the EU: influences on UK 
social security law” (2018, JSSL, forthcoming) 
4 Annick Masselot, Roberta Guerrina and Bridgette McLellan, “What part did the EU play in 
raising women’s pensionable age?”, LSE Brexit Blog (16 June 2016) available at 
http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/2016/06/16/what-part-did-the-eu-play-in-raising-womens-
pensionable-age/ [accessed 13 November 2017] 
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economic paradigm”5 in Föster in 2008, where the court held that welfare rights derived from 
the status of being an EU citizen rather than from an individual’s economic activity, to more 
restrictive judgments, including Dano in 2015, which have reconsolidated the “economic 
paradigm” for social solidarity.6 This shift is further evidenced and facilitated by the EU 
Commission’s agreement for the UK to implement a now legally obsolete ‘emergency brake’ 
to restrict access to in-work benefits for four years from the point of employment7 – a 
conditional citizenship that hinged on economic contribution to the host state, and not on EU 
citizenship and residence in the host state, or work prospects, or family, and with a nationally 
imposed categorisation of universal credit (UC) as social assistance, which carries less 
protection than those benefits categorised as social insurance.8 More broadly, it is not the 
case that the EU’s approach to rights protection is automatically preferable. As McCrudden 
makes clear, “[t]raditional UK approaches to the protection of rights, through common law 
and Parliamentary legislation, should not always be assumed to result in less good protection 
of rights.”9 The concern, however, is that future rights protection under UK law is unlikely to 
cover social security claimants adequately if EU protections no longer hold,10 and that the 
potential contrast with progressive EU action under a pillar of social rights will become more 
stark.11 
 
                                                      
5 R Babayev, “Re-shaping the paradigm of social solidarity in the EU: on the UK’s welfare 
reforms and pre- and post-EU” (2016) European Journal of Social Security 356 
6 R Babayev, “Re-shaping the paradigm of social solidarity in the EU: on the UK’s welfare 
reforms and pre- and post-EU” (2016) European Journal of Social Security 356, 360-361 
7 The Universal Credit (EEA Jobseekers) Amendment Regulations 2015 (SI No.546). See also 
the correspondence between the Social Security Advisory Committee and the Minister for 
Work and Pensions, Iain Duncan Smith, on these regulations: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/universal-credit-entitlement-of-eea-
nationals  
8 Social assistance benefits are subject to greater restrictions than contributory benefits such 
as pensions, healthcare, unemployment insurance which are nationality blind and EU co-
ordination of social security under Reg.883/2004 does not apply to social assistance benefits. 
See R Babayev, “Re-shaping the paradigm of social solidarity in the EU: on the UK’s welfare 
reforms and pre- and post-EU” (2016) European Journal of Social Security 356 and the 
questioning of this categorisation at 373-5. 
9 C McCrudden, The Good Friday Agreement, Brexit and Rights (2017) A Royal Irish Academy 
and British Academy Policy Discussion Paper, p6 
10 See G Phillipson and A Young, “Would use of the prerogative to denounce the ECHR 
‘frustrate’ the Human Rights Act? Lessons from Miller” (2017) Public Law 150, analysing the 
concerns over the Human Rights Act post-Brexit  
11 European Parliament, A European Pillar of Social Rights, 19 January 2017, available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P8-TA-2017-
0010+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN [accessed 18 December 2017]. Future developments may also 
include an EU unemployment benefit system, although it seems likely that, even without 
Brexit, this would not have been a suitable option for the UK: G McKeever and M Simpson, 
‘Worlds of welfare collide: implementing a European unemployment benefit scheme in the 
UK’ (2017) 19 European Journal of Social Security 21 
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Migrants 
The UK’s attempt to restrict social security benefits to non-UK nationals has been based 
largely on a view of social security benefits acting as a magnet for immigrants. This myth of 
magnetisation, however, has been comprehensively debunked: 
 
“All legally employed workers may receive benefits for which they make contributions, 
including health care, pension rights and unemployment insurance. Nobody is 
proposing that legally employed intra-EU migrant workers should be cut out of these 
core contributory social security provisions. This leaves only the issue of non-
contributory social welfare benefits, which tells us that the political debate over 
curtailing these benefits in order to discourage migration is a red herring.”12 
 
Nevertheless the potency of this political myth persists, feeding from and into populist views 
on immigration and freedom of movement which are seen as central drivers for Brexit. It 
seems likely, therefore, that we can anticipate significant changes to the rights of non-UK 
nationals to move to the UK. The consequential impact will not just be on social security 
entitlement but on the rights of migrants to access work.13 This will clearly generate impacts 
relating to in-work benefits, including universal credit (UC) and tax credits, but more 
substantively it will impact on sectoral employment that relies on immigrant labour.14 This 
then becomes a labour market supply question, requiring decisions about domestic labour 
markets and domestic workers.  The social security system has long since been a vehicle for 
managing individuals into the labour market, and this focus has been heightened under UC 
which adopts a new policy approach of applying conditionality to those already in work. There 
is currently no ready supply of home-grown labourers to replace migrant workers, raising 
questions over whether the social security system will play a role in moulding domestic 
workers into a migrant worker model through increasing conditionality for jobseekers and 
low-paid workers.15 If migrant workers are no longer to be recruited, then arguably there will 
also need to be a cut-off point at which National Insurance numbers are issued. This yet to be 
considered date might automatically tally with the agreement in the Joint Report that EU 
                                                      
12 M Emerson, Cameron’s ‘renegotiations’ (or Russian roulette) with the EU: An interim 
assessment, CEPS Working Document No.413 (2015), p3, available at  
https://www.ceps.eu/system/files/WD413%20ME%20Camerons%20renegotiations_0.pdf 
[accessed 13 November 2017]. See N Harris, “Demagnetisation of social security and health 
care for migrants to the UK” (2016) European Journal of Social Security 130 
13 See for example Majella Kilkey, “Conditioning Family-life at the Intersection of Migration 
and Welfare: The Implications for ‘Brexit Families’” (2017) Journal of Social Policy 1-18 
14 See for example P Taylor-Gooby, “Re-Doubling the Crises of the Welfare State: The impact 
of Brexit on UK welfare Politics” (2017) Journal of Social Policy 46(4), 815-835 
15 P Taylor-Gooby points to evidence that the average hourly wage in sectors which have the 
highest volumes of migrant workers from the 2004 accession countries is significantly below 
the average hourly wage of UK-born workers, leading to his conclusion that average wages 
for UK workers will fall or the jobs will remain unfilled: “Re-Doubling the Crises of the Welfare 
State: The impact of Brexit on UK welfare Politics” (2017) Journal of Social Policy 46(4), 815-
835 
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citizens can access their EU rights up until the day of the UK’s withdrawal,16 but to date there 
has been no obvious consideration of how this will impact on the issuing of national insurance 
numbers, no preparations for deadline focused migrant applications for National Insurance 
numbers, and equally there has been no obvious planning on how to plug the migrant worker 
gap.  
 
Legislation 
Brexit creates a need for all government departments to consider which pieces of EU 
legislation impact their policy areas, and whether particular regulations should be carried 
over into UK law, amended or scrapped. The process of transposing EU law into domestic law 
will impact on all policy areas, not just social security, with the European Union (Withdrawal) 
Bill creating far-reaching political and constitutional concerns, but social security serves to 
highlight some of the more troublesome aspects relating to process, substance and 
compatibility.  
 
Elliott’s initial analysis of the Bill is that it is “technical, dense and complex” and he highlights 
concerns in particular with the scrutiny of the domestic legislation that will flow from Brexit: 
 
“The Explanatory Notes accompanying the Bill are replete with references to 
“correcting” EU law as it is converted into domestic law. But to suggest … that the 
Withdrawal Bill facilitates some form of technocratic exercise involving the dotting of 
“i”s and the crossing of “t”s so as to ensure that the statute book is tidied up in time 
for exit day lacks any basis in reality ...  What needs to be done between now and exit 
day is nothing short of a Herculean task … The delegated powers granted by the Bill 
are as extraordinarily vague as they are broad; the arrangements for parliamentary 
oversight are … inadequate …”17 
 
As the Bill has progressed through its parliamentary stages, none of these concerns have 
abated. The stated purposed of the EU (Withdrawal) Bill is to replicate the EU and EU-related 
law on ‘exit day’ turning this into a body of domestic law known as retained EU law. Even 
where existing provisions are replicated, however, there is a question over how confident we 
can be that once transposed into UK law, the rules will not subsequently be abandoned: the 
EU (Withdrawal) Bill provides a mechanism whereby the UK can quietly repeal, or amend, 
these EU laws, one by one, without proper scrutiny. The switch to delegated power intended 
under clause 7(1) of the Bill provides Ministers with the power to pass regulations to prevent, 
remedy or mitigate ‘deficiencies’ in retained EU law or deal with its failure to operate 
                                                      
16 TF50 (2017) 19 – Commission to EU 27, Joint report from the negotiators of the European 
Union and the United Kingdom Government on progress during phase 1 of negotiations 
under Article 50 TEU on the United Kingdom's orderly withdrawal from the European Union. 
The Joint Report provides that UK and EU citizens will be able to exercise their EU rights in 
until the time of the UK’s withdrawal from the EU: para. 8 
17 Mark Elliott, “The EU (Withdrawal) Bill: Initial Thoughts”, Public Law for Everyone blog (14 
July 2017) available at https://publiclawforeveryone.com/2017/07/14/the-eu-withdrawal-
bill-initial-thoughts/ [accessed 13 November 2017] 
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‘effectively’, without any attempt to define efficiencies or deficiencies.18 Changes will be done 
by Ministerial orders, which cannot be amended, and are rarely even debated, adding to Lord 
Judge’s lament that:  
 
“by the time the Brexit process has finished its Parliamentary journey, we shall have 
irremediably cemented lawmaking by un-scrutinised legislation into our constitutional 
arrangements.”19   
 
The conclusion of the Hansard Society is that “[c]onstitutional principles about the 
relationship between the executive and the legislature are at stake” and that there is a need 
for proper parliamentary scrutiny to redress this balance.20 Despite this concern, a Labour 
amendment calling for a scrutiny committee to consider secondary legislation passed under 
the bill was defeated by 311 votes to 292.21 The government’s concession to avoid losing the 
vote was to agree to create a new committee of MPs to ‘sift’ secondary legislation by 
determining when an affirmative, rather than negative resolution procedure would be 
required. It is difficult to describe this as scrutiny, since all it can deliver is delay rather than 
amendment, which does little to allay concerns about Ministerial overreach. 
 
While the worrying prospect remains that the EU (Withdrawal) Bill paves the way for 
“constitutional vandalism” as a means of removing swathes of EU law,22 for social security a 
more prosaic concern arises. As Harris notes, the likely changes to social security will be 
“highly technical (not least where effecting transitional arrangements) and elusively obscure, 
hidden within Brexit’s murkiest waters”.23 Even minor changes in social security regulations 
produce ripple effects into what are already murky waters, that will be further muddied by 
the inclusion of Brexit mandated changes. The unintended consequence of transposing 
already sizeable chunks of legislation may well be that such “elusively obscure” provisions 
                                                      
18 See House of Commons Library, Briefing Paper Number 8171, The European Union 
(Withdrawal) Bill: clause 7 “the correcting power”, 6 December 2017 
19 The Right Hon Lord Judge PC, “A Judge’s View on the Rule of Law” (2017) Annual Bingham 
Lecture, available at 
https://www.biicl.org/documents/1637_2017_05_11transcript_of_lord_judges_speech_3.p
df?showdocument=1 [accessed 13 November 2017] 
20 R Fox, J Blackwell and B Fowler, Taking Back Control for Brexit and Beyond: Delegated 
legislation, Parliamentary scrutiny and the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill, 2017 Hansard 
Society. See also Hansard Society, European Union (Withdrawal) Bill: Briefing for days 6 and 
7, House of Commons Committee Stage debate, December 2017, available at 
https://assets.contentful.com/xkbace0jm9pp/3LeMZztWXuKugIAcAkESWG/343a1b1e0376c
a6420b9384cf8faf722/EU_W_B_Briefing_FINAL.pdf [accessed 18 December 2017] 
21 To date (January 2018) the only defeat the government has suffered on the Bill has been 
on clause 9, by an amendment tabled by Dominic Grieve MP, which leaves Brexit subject to 
the prior enactment of a statute by parliament approving the final terms of withdrawal of 
the United Kingdom from the European Union 
22 C Harvey, A Time of Crisis and Challenge: Brexit and our Constitutional Future, QPol blog, 
22 November 2017, available at http://qpol.qub.ac.uk/crisis-challenge-brexit-ni-
constitutional-future/ [accessed 18 December 2017] 
23 N Harris, “Editorial” (2016) 23 Journal of Social Security Law, 113, at 115. 
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that happen downstream will be overlooked to the potential detriment of claimants who are 
directly affected.24 
 
In addition to the standard lack of scrutiny jeopardising the protection of existing rights, there 
remains a question over whether the replication of complex social security provisions can 
compete with shifting national and devolved policy agendas.25 The government’s White Paper 
on Brexit anticipates a greater role for Parliamentary select committees in scrutinising the 
legislation flowing from the Withdrawal Bill,26 but makes no mention of the Social Security 
Advisory Committee, a statutory, non-departmental public body that currently reviews draft 
social security legislation and which exists, in part, because of the already highly complex and 
technical nature of social security provisions which require independent scrutiny.27 Given the 
pressure that Parliament and its committees will face in discharging the “Herculean task” of 
scrutiny, the SSAC exists as a model for enhanced scrutiny which it would seem sensible for 
the government to utilise.28 The need for enhanced scrutiny has been confirmed by the House 
                                                      
24 See for example the technical amendment to the Child Benefit (General) Regulations 2006 
through the Child Benefit (General) (Amendment) Regulations 2017. This impacted on 
entitlement to Child Benefit in Northern Ireland for a qualifying young person in “approved 
training”.  The list of approved training is provided under regulation 1(3) of the Child Benefit 
(General) Regulations 2006, which required to be amended to include a new approved 
training scheme in Northern Ireland, funded through the EU PEACE IV Children and Young 
People 2.1 initiative. The uncontroversial and technical amendment to the definition of 
“approved training” also had an unforeseen impact on the interaction of the £8 a day 
incentive payment for attendance and the earnings disregard in a young person’s claim for 
UC or JSA, which had to be addressed. The removal of the incentive payment would have had 
a significant impact on those young people affected by the change, but it was such a far-
removed and obscure consequence that it had not been identified by the legislative drafters 
of the original technical amendment. 
25 See The Right Hon Lord Judge PC, “A Judge’s View on the Rule of Law” (2017) Annual 
Bingham Lecture, available at 
https://www.biicl.org/documents/1637_2017_05_11transcript_of_lord_judges_speech_3.p
df?showdocument=1 [accessed 13 November 2017], in which Lord Judge states: The last time 
the Commons rejected a statutory instrument was in 1979, over 35 years ago. At least the 
Lords has rejected 6 such instruments since 1968, that is, in almost 50 years.”  
26 HM Government, The United Kingdom’s exit from and new partnership with the European 
Union (Cm 9417, 2017) para.1.9. See also J Tomlinson, The Individual in the Reformation of 
the UK's Bureaucratic State—Administrative Justice, Brexit, and Human Rights, (March 12, 
2017), available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=2933880  
27 G McKeever, “Legislative Scrutiny, Co-ordination and the Social Security Advisory 
Committee: from system coherence to Scottish devolution” (2016) Journal of Social Security 
Law 126 
28 See Social Security Advisory Committee, Is there a role for bodies similar to the Social 
Security Advisory Committee (SSAC)? (2017) available at: 
http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/pro
cedure-committee/exiting-the-european-union-scrutiny-of-delegated-
legislation/written/70712.html [accessed 11 November 2017] submitted as evidence to the 
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of Commons Procedure Committee in light of the “unique and unprecedented” task facing 
the House of Commons in the process of transposing EU law into domestic legislation,29 but 
the Parliamentary rejection of a scrutiny amendment means that there is unlikely to be 
adequate alignment of transposed EU law with existing social security legislation, creating 
further potential for uncertainty or retrogression in the protection of social security rights.30 
 
 
Northern Ireland: constitutional and political context 
 
To state the obvious but critical point, Northern Ireland is the only part of the UK that shares 
a land border with another EU country. As well as the significance of this physical landscape, 
a history of conflict and poverty are writ large on Northern Ireland’s political and economic 
landscape. The EU referendum in Northern Ireland resulted in a majority remain vote, with 
56 per cent of the population voting to remain in the EU and, within this overall majority, an 
average of 64 per cent of those living in the border counties voting to remain (Fig.1).31 
 
                                                      
House of Commons Procedure Committee’s Inquiry on Exiting the European Union: scrutiny 
of delegated legislation (2017) 
29 House of Commons Procedure Committee, Scrutiny of delegated legislation under the 
European Union (Withdrawal) Bill: interim report, First Report of 2017-19 (2017) HC 386, 
available at:  
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201719/cmselect/cmproced/386/386.pdf 
[accessed 11 November 2017] 
30 See C McCrudden, The Good Friday Agreement, Brexit and Rights (2017, British Academy 
and the Royal Irish Academy) pp5-6.  
31 The voting division in Northern Ireland is also reflective of divisions in identity in Northern 
Ireland, with those identifying as British/Unionist/Protestant more likely to have voted to 
leave the EU, while those identifying as Irish/Nationalist/Catholic more likely to have voted 
to remain: see Lords EU Committee, Brexit: Devolution, para. 39 and J Gary, The EU 
referendum Vote in Northern Ireland: Implications for our understanding of citizens’ political 
views and behaviour (2016) Knowledge Exchange Seminar Series, Northern Ireland Assembly, 
http://www.niassembly.gov.uk/globalassets/documents/raise/knowledge_exchange/briefin
g_papers/series6/garry121016.pdf  
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Figure 1: Breakdown of the ‘remain’ vote in the EU referendum in Northern Ireland 
(source: Irish Political Maps)32 
 
It also remains obvious that Northern Ireland is a post-conflict society with a fragile peace 
settlement which continues to be plagued by political crises. The 1998 Belfast (Good Friday) 
Agreement (GFA) provides a complex, nuanced framework for Northern Ireland’s 
constitutional and political structures as well as inter-party and inter-governmental 
relationships: within Northern Ireland, between Northern Ireland and the Republic, between 
the island of Ireland and Great Britain, as well as between the Irish and UK Governments.33 
The issue of citizens’ rights and identity was part of this new constitutional settlement. As 
McCrudden states, the GFA “was much more than a rights-driven document”, but 
nonetheless rights remain a central construct in each aspect of the Agreement, and although 
“the EU was never conceived as the sole guarantor of rights in Northern Ireland, rights 
deriving from the EU are, nevertheless, an important dimension of the post-GFA 
architecture.”34 Moreover, the Agreement was based on a shared assumption that the UK 
                                                      
32 Irish Political Maps, European Union Referendum 2016: Northern Ireland, available at: 
http://irishpoliticalmaps.blogspot.co.uk/2016/06/european-union-referendum-2016-
northern.html [accessed 14 November 2017] 
33 Northern Ireland Office, The Belfast Agreement (1998), available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-belfast-agreement [accessed 14 
November 2017] 
34 C McCrudden, The Good Friday Agreement, Brexit and Rights (2017, British Academy and 
the Royal Irish Academy), pp3-4. See also A Morgan, The Belfast Agreement: A practical legal 
analysis (2000, Belfast: The Belfast Press) for a detailed account of the constitutional history 
and impact of the GFA, and its context in public international and European law. 
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and Ireland would remain within the EU, with this shared EU citizenship helping to diffuse 
more contentious concepts of national identity in Northern Ireland.  EU law is interwoven 
within Northern Ireland’s intricate political and legal systems, creating an additional layer of 
relationships between Northern Ireland, Ireland, Britain and the EU,35 and there has been 
heavy investment by the EU in Northern Ireland’s peace process, a point recognized by the 
House of Lords EU Committee which emphasized the positive role played by the EU in 
establishing and maintaining peace in Northern Ireland.36 The consequent risk that Brexit 
poses to this intricate arrangement is explained by Dougan: 
 
“The ultimate concern is that the cumulative effects of economic uncertainty and 
instability, fundamental changes to the longstanding constitutional framework which 
has underpinned the peace process, and the potential for one or both of the main 
communities to feel that important aspects of their identity are under pressure, will 
render even more difficult the task of securing political stability and promoting social 
cohesion.”37 
 
The constitutional and political implications of Brexit, therefore, create another obstacle for 
Northern Ireland’s fragile and often dysfunctional governance systems to overcome.  
 
One of the possibilities that has been mooted to help overcome this obstacle has been to 
allocate ‘special status’ to Northern Ireland within the EU, recognising its unique 
geographical, economic and political circumstances and enabling the continued movement of 
people, goods and services across the border, including protecting access to EU rights 
pertaining to employment, social security and healthcare.38 The examination of cross border 
                                                      
35 House of Lords European Union Committee, Brexit: Devolution, Fourth Report of 2017-19 
(2017) HL No.9, pp 9-10 
36 The Committee identified four ways in which the EU had contributed to the peace process: 
“the safeguards that EU membership provides in underpinning the Belfast/Good Friday 
Agreement; the role that common UK-Irish EU membership played and continues to play in 
transforming relations between the two countries; the effect of common EU membership in 
diluting cross- community tensions in Northern Ireland; and the positive impact of EU funding 
in Northern Ireland.” House of Lords European Union Committee, Brexit: UK-Irish Relations, 
Sixth Report of 2016-17 (2016) HL No.76, para.159. C Gallagher and K O’Byrne note that 
Northern Ireland is more dependent on EU funding than any other region of the UK, 
amounting to over €7bn in funding for European programmes, including towards the peace 
process, from 2007-2020: Report on how Designated Special Status for Northern Ireland 
within the EU can be delivered, Doughty Street Chambers, October 2017,  para.3.35, available 
at http://www.guengl.eu/uploads/publications-
documents/NI_Special_status_report_161017_FINAL_crops.pdf  
37 M Dougan, “The Northern Irish Border”, in M Dougan (ed.) The UK after Brexit: Legal and 
Policy Challenges (2017, Cambridge: Intersentia) p54 
38 Dáithí Ó Ceallaigh, Brexit: a status report (2017) Institute of International & European 
Affairs, available at http://www.iiea.com/ftp/Publications/2017/StatusReport_V19.pdf 
[accessed 14 November 2017).  See also the recommendation of the Irish Committee on the 
Implementation of the Good Friday Agreement that the Irish government should negotiate 
for Northern Ireland to be designated with special status within the EU and for the whole 
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Brexit issues by the Irish Joint Committee on Jobs, Enterprise and Innovation, for example, 
has recommended ‘special status’ specifically to protect social security rights.39 While Harvey 
points out that Northern Ireland already holds a unique constitutional position as a result of 
the GFA,40 any extension of this uniqueness to deal with Brexit has been rejected by unionists 
in Northern Ireland who object to marking Northern Ireland out as different from the other 
parts of the UK. At the same time that ‘special status’ for Northern Ireland has been rejected 
by unionists, there has also been a growing narrative on a ‘border poll’ on the unification of 
Ireland. Both the poll and reunification itself remain unlikely prospects at present but these 
are now proposals that have considerably more credibility than was the case prior to the 
outcome of the referendum.41 The voting patterns in the Brexit referendum were partially 
split along ethno-national lines: 85% of those who identified as ‘Catholics’ voted ‘Remain’ 
compared to 40% of those who identified as ‘Protestant’,42 supporting Tonge’s conclusion 
that “the binary divide is being reinforced … by Brexit.”43  
 
Any reinforcement of a binary divide returns us to Dougan’s concerns on the ability to 
maintain political stability but it also potentially underlines a mirror-image party-political 
divide on social security which has the proven ability to destabilise the Northern Ireland 
institutions, as the history of the Welfare Reform (Northern Ireland) Order 2015 makes 
clear.44 Social security is fully devolved to Northern Ireland but has traditionally replicated 
                                                      
island of Ireland to have a unique solution as part of the Brexit negotiation: Brexit and the 
future of Ireland: Uniting Ireland & its people in peace & prosperity, August 2017, 
https://senatormarkdaly.files.wordpress.com/2017/04/section-1-pdf.pdf   
39 Irish Joint Committee on Jobs, Enterprise and Innovation, The Likely Economic Impact of 
Brexit with Particular Emphasis on Jobs and Enterprise (March 2017) 32 JEI 004, at 
http://www.oireachtas.ie/parliament/media/committees/jobsenterpriseandinnovation/32n
dreports/Brexit-and-its-impact-on-jobs-and-enterprise.pdf 
40 C Harvey, A Time of Crisis and Challenge: Brexit and our Constitutional Future, QPol Blog (22 
November 2017) available at http://qpol.qub.ac.uk/crisis-challenge-brexit-ni-constitutional-
future/ [accessed 23 November 2017] 
41 A border poll is likely to be resisted strongly by Northern Ireland’s unionist politicians, and 
given the Conservative government’s dependence on support by MPs from the Democratic 
Unionist Party and the requirement under the Northern Ireland Act 1998 that a poll can only 
be called by the Northern Ireland Secretary, it remains an improbable move for the 
immediate future. However, unionist objections to a border poll might also provide political 
leverage for the UK government in the extreme, to enable special arrangements to apply to 
Northern Ireland: “For the UK government, the biggest incentive to offer such a solution to 
Scotland and Northern Ireland would be that it represents a tangible alternative to 
secession.” – N Scoutaris, “Territorial Differentiation in EU Law: Can Scotland and Northern 
Ireland Remain in the EU and/or the Single Market?” (2017) Cambridge Yearbook of 
European Legal Studies, 19, 287, at 309 
42 Brexit Law NI, Preliminary Findings Report: Brexit and the Peace Process (2017) available at: 
https://brexitlawni.org/assets/uploads/BrexitLawNI-Preliminary-Findings-Report-Peace-
Process.pdf [accessed 11 November 2017] 
43 House of Lords European Union Committee, Brexit: Devolution, Fourth Report of 2017-19 
(2017) HL No.9, para. 39 
44 SI 2006/01 
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British social security legislation: the history of social security in Northern Ireland has been 
premised from the outset on the (unionist) political imperative to treat Northern Ireland the 
same as the rest of the UK, regardless of the substantially different economic circumstances 
in Northern Ireland that the social security system has had to respond to.45 While the current 
economic reality makes substantive social security divergence unlikely, it was the political 
differences between the main unionist and republican parties in the Northern Ireland 
Executive that were played out through the 2015 Order where the choice was between a 
unionist preference for parity with the equivalent legislation in Britain and the republican 
preference for bespoke social security reform specific to Northern Ireland. The compromise 
position – replication with time limited mitigations – was at least possible due to a functioning 
Northern Ireland Executive and Assembly, with British and Irish government support. The 
current absence of these power-sharing institutions make compromises across the binary 
divide more difficult to achieve, even on the non-sectarian issue of social security.46 
 
This binary divide may become further pronounced with the UK government’s ‘confidence 
and supply’ arrangement with Northern Ireland’s largest unionist party, the Democratic 
Unionist Party (DUP). As Harvey explains, there is: 
 
“a distinctive logic to [Northern Ireland’s] political constitutionalism that follows 
power-sharing principles, all the way up and down. It is not apparent that Whitehall 
and Westminster get this; the current arrangement with the DUP probably does not 
assist.”47  
 
While a confidence and supply arrangement is not an unusual form of establishing a 
parliamentary majority, it weighs alongside the current imbalance of political voices from 
Northern Ireland within the UK Parliament that further reinforces the binary, ethno-national 
divide. This imbalance of political perspective is exacerbated by the absence of any nationalist 
politicians at Westminster as a result of the decision of Sinn Fein MPs not to take their seats 
in the UK Parliament.48 The EU Committee has already issued a warning that Northern 
                                                      
45 G McKeever, “Legislative Scrutiny, Co-ordination and the Social Security Advisory 
Committee: from system coherence to Scottish devolution” (2016) Journal of Social Security 
Law 126, 136-138; M Simpson, “Developing constitutional principles through firefighting” 
(2015) Journal of Social Security Law 31. There are echoes here, too, of the objections of 
unionist politicians in Northern Ireland post-World War two, where immigration checks 
existed for those travelling between Northern Ireland and Britain, a problem defined by the 
British government as being of the Irish government’s making, in the latter’s refusal to adopt 
similar immigration policies to Britain: B Ryan, “The Common Travel Area between Britain and 
Ireland” (2001) Modern Law Review 855, 858 
46 See AM Gray and D Birrell, “Coalition Government in Northern Ireland: Social Policy and 
the Lowest Common Denominator Thesis” (2012) 11 Social Policy and Society 15 
47 Colin Harvey, Judging Brexit solutions (2017) available at 
https://brexitlawni.org/blog/judging-brexit-solutions/ [accessed 13 November 2017] 
48 The largest nationalist party in Northern Ireland, Sinn Fein, won 7 seats in the 2017 General 
Election but the party’s long-standing policy is that it will not take its seats in the UK 
parliament. The nationalist Social Democratic and Labour Party, which did traditionally take 
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Ireland’s fragile, cross-community peace settlement should not become “collateral damage” 
of Brexit,49 reinforcing Harvey’s concern that the principle of power-sharing arrangements is 
at risk.  
 
The ability of the devolved administrations in the UK to influence the UK government’s 
decisions on Brexit is limited. Despite arguments that “the Westminster Parliament has 
endorsed and created a constitutionally pluralist UK, with genuine legal as well as political 
bite”,50 the Supreme Court’s decision in Miller found that there was no legal right for devolved 
assemblies to be consulted over triggering Article 50 TEU, with the Sewel Convention being 
read as a political rather than legal convention.51 More specifically, Miller  held that there was 
nothing in the Good Friday Agreement to require consultation with the Northern Ireland 
Assembly before beginning the process of withdrawal from the EU, although the 
constitutional right for Northern Ireland citizens to hold Irish (EU) citizenship flows from the 
Agreement. To have answered the constitutional question otherwise would, perhaps, have 
brought its own problems, but it is fair to say that there is not universal acceptance among 
constitutional lawyers that the court made the right decision.52 
 
The absence of legal solutions to require engagement with devolved government voices 
mirrors the absence of substantive political engagement with devolved government 
concerns. The UK government has adopted “a ‘whole UK approach which affords the devolved 
nations little constitutional protection of their interests, or accommodation of their 
demands.”53  The House of Lords EU Committee welcomed the creation of a Joint Ministerial 
Committee (European Negotiations) to engender a more diverse perspective but concluded 
that the government needed to “raise its game” to make the JMC (EU) more effective, having 
taken evidence that the Committee functioned more as a venue for managing disagreements 
rather than engaging with issues and finding solutions.54 There is no devolved representation 
in the Cabinet committee dealing with the EU exit (DEXEU); the Secretary of State for 
Northern Ireland can attend as required, at the government’s invitation. Northern Ireland 
itself has done little to no planning for Brexit – no departmental or Executive papers were 
issued before the referendum, although a paper by the European Policy and Co-ordination 
                                                      
its seats at Westminster, did not win any in the 2017 General Election, and nor did the cross-
community Alliance party. Northern Ireland also currently has one Independent Unionist MP. 
49 House of Lords European Union Committee, Brexit: Devolution, Fourth Report of 2017-19 
(2017) HL No.9, para. 95; see also House of Lords European Union Committee, Brexit: UK-Irish 
Relations, Sixth Report of 2016-17 (2016) HL No.76 which reached the same conclusion 
50 C Harvey, “Has Nothing Really Changed Here? Brief Reflections on the ‘Brexit Litigation’” 
RightsNI Blog (2 December 2016) available at http://rightsni.org/2016/12/has-nothing-really-
changed-here-brief-reflections-on-the-brexit-litigation/ [accessed 14 November 2017] 
51 R (on the application of Miller and another) (Respondents) v Secretary of State for Exiting 
the European Union (Appellant) [2017] UKSC 5 
52 Paul Craig, “Miller: Structural constitutional review and the limits of prerogative power” 
(2017) Public Law 48 
53 J Hunt, “Devolution”, in M Dougan (ed.) The UK after Brexit: Legal and Policy Challenges 
(2017, Cambridge: Intersentia) p38 
54 House of Lords European Union Committee, Brexit: Devolution, Fourth Report of 2017-19 
(2017) HL No.9, para. 292-293 
 14 
Unit within the Office of First Minister and Deputy First Minister analysing the potential 
impact of Brexit for the UK and Northern Ireland was completed in May 2015, but not released 
until after the referendum.55 In August 2016, a joint letter by the former First and Deputy First 
Ministers was sent to the Prime Minister, Theresa May MP, outlining areas of concern for 
Northern Ireland flowing from Brexit.56 By the time the Northern Ireland Assembly had 
collapsed six months later, no further Brexit plans had been laid. Unsurprisingly, therefore, 
post-Brexit social security concerns have not featured prominently in any of the limited 
discussions to date, despite being a fully devolved policy area for Northern Ireland.57  
 
Perhaps the silver lining here is that the concerns around the refusal of the UK government 
to automatically repatriate EU powers to devolved assemblies in less likely to impact on social 
security provision than other areas, such as environmental law.58 This creates some scope for 
bespoke bilateral social security arrangements between Northern Ireland and other states 
even though the EU powers that will pass back to Westminster post-Brexit will be in relation 
to the co-ordination of social security entitlements across the EU and the rights of migrants 
to access benefits, both of which are areas over which devolved administrations currently 
hold little power. For Northern Ireland, however, the silver lining comes in a dark cloud that 
is the continued absence of a functioning executive and legislative assembly. 
 
 
The Republic of Ireland dimension 
 
The current arrangements affecting people, goods and services travelling between the 
Republic of Ireland, Northern Ireland and Britain predate Ireland and the UK joining the EU.59 
The Common Travel Area (CTA) was the product of pragmatic arrangements between Ireland 
and the UK following the partition of Ireland and the creation of the Irish Free State in 1922 
to facilitate Britain’s need to recruit Irish labour after the second world war, the difficulty of 
controlling the Irish/Northern Irish land border, and the inconvenience that border controls 
would create for the inhabitants of Northern Ireland.60 It operated as an administrative 
                                                      
55 European Policy and Co-ordination Unit, Preliminary analysis of the impact of a UK 
Referendum on its membership of the European Union (2015) available at: https://thedetail-
website.s3.amazonaws.com/asset/upload/2098/here.pdf [accessed 14 December 2017] 
56 Letter to the Prime Minister, the Rt Hon Theresa May MP from the First Minister and deputy 
First Minister of the Northern Ireland Executive, (10 August 2016), available at: 
https://www.executiveoffice-
ni.gov.uk/sites/default/files/publications/execoffice/Letter%20to%20PM%20from%20FM%2
0%26%20dFM.pdf [accessed 14 November 2017] 
57 It should be noted that immigration is a reserved matter and that Northern Ireland is not 
likely to see an increase in devolved powers to deal with social security/immigration overlaps.  
58 The powers currently held by the EU will be returned to Westminster in the first instance. 
UK government Ministers will will then determine on a case by case basis whether these 
powers will be released to devolved administrations, using Orders in Council. 
59 Mary E. Daly, Brexit and the Irish Border: Historical context (2017) A Royal Irish Academy 
and British Academy Policy Discussion Paper 
60 B Ryan, “The Common Travel area between Britain and Ireland” (2001) 64 Modern Law 
Review 855, 860 
 15 
agreement, premised on Irish citizens not being treated as ‘aliens’ in the UK, and Ireland 
continuing to implement the same immigration policies and controls as the UK.61 The 
reciprocal status of British and Irish citizens in each other’s jurisdictions are still governed by 
equivalent exceptions to border control reflecting the need to be able to facilitate the 
movement of goods, services and people, the political sensitivities of enforcing border 
controls, and the physical difficulty of immigration control on the 300 mile long Irish border 
which does not follow natural boundaries and has over 270 land border crossings.62 This 
agreement between Ireland and the UK has been been recognised by Protocol 20 annexed to 
the Treaty of Lisbon, and EU membership by Ireland and the UK has been instrumental in 
easing the flow of goods and people across the Irish border:  
 
“British and Irish membership of the EEC/EU has been a very significant force in 
improving cross-border infrastructure and providing a legal framework for the free 
movement of goods, services and people. The Single European Market of 1993 and 
the removal of security checks following the Good Friday Agreement combined to 
make the border invisible.”63 
 
The reality to date has been that UK and Ireland have treated each others citizens more 
favourably than is required under EU law, and will wish to continue to do so post-Brexit. The 
EU’s support for this position is now also clear, following the recognition in the December 
2017 Joint Agreement that the UK and Ireland can maintain the arrangements supporting the 
CTA post-Brexit.64 
 
The Irish government’s approach to Brexit, and its implications for Ireland north and south, 
has involved a more robust response to the border problems than has been the case by either 
the (former) Northern Ireland administration or the UK government. Most notably, Ireland 
has secured agreement with the EU that Northern Ireland can automatically rejoin the EU in 
the event of Irish reunification.65 Focusing on protecting access to EU rights pertaining to 
employment, social security and healthcare, the Irish government has made clear that: 
 
“The UK remaining in the EEA, EFTA, or the Customs Union would be a best case 
scenario for Ireland (apart from the UK remaining a member of the EU) as it would 
                                                      
61 B Ryan, “The Common Travel area between Britain and Ireland” (2001) 64 Modern Law 
Review 855 
62 See the interactive map at http://www.borderroadmemories.com [accessed 18 December  
2017. During the years of ‘the Troubles’ in Northern Ireland, only 20 land borders were 
allowed to remain open. 
63 Mary E. Daly, Brexit and the Irish Border: Historical context (2017) A Royal Irish Academy 
and British Academy Policy Discussion Paper, pp5-6 
64 TF50 (2017) 19 – Commission to EU 27, Joint report from the negotiators of the European 
Union and the United Kingdom Government on progress during phase 1 of negotiations 
under Article 50 TEU on the United Kingdom's orderly withdrawal from the European Union, 
para. 54 
65 European Council, Minutes of Special meeting of the European Council (Art.50) held on 29 
April 2017 (23 June 2017), available at http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/xT-
20010–2017-INIT/en/pdf  [accessed 10 November 2017] 
 16 
represent the closest possible relationship to the current arrangement. This model 
would also have the least impact on the border with Northern Ireland …”66 
 
A Seanad Special Committee on the Withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European 
Union, established to consider the implications for Ireland of Brexit, takes the view that:  
 
“the negatives far outweigh the positives when it comes to the impact of Brexit on 
Ireland. Our report reflects this and is based on the overwhelming evidence offered 
by our witnesses.”67  
 
It seems fair to say that Brexit is seen as an act of aggression and hostility by many Irish 
politicians and commentators. Former Taoiseach John Bruton told the Seanad Committee in 
April 2017, that “[t]he terms for Brexit, as set out so far by Mrs May, will do incalculable 
damage to this island, politically, emotionally and economically.”68 Commentator Noel 
Wheelan asserts that  “[t]riggering the Brexit process is the most harmful act perpetrated by 
a British government on Ireland … in 95 years”,69 while Fintan O’Toole observes that “there’s 
… a very particular kind of anger in Ireland because the effects on us are so profound.”70 It 
seems equally fair to say that these perspectives have not been very visible in the Anglo-
centric analysis on how Ireland will respond to Brexit. Indeed, the ‘Irish question’ generated 
surprise and contempt in the UK’s popular presses when the potential for this issue to derail 
the UK’s progress on Brexit became headline news.71 The political realities mean that the Irish 
government will wish to avoid further damage to the UK-Irish relationship, and the Irish 
                                                      
66 Joint Committee on Jobs, Enterprise and Innovation, The Likely Economic Impact of Brexit 
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Taoiseach and Foreign Minister have continued to state that they will work with the UK 
government to achieve the best possible outcome for Ireland, north and south. Regardless of 
this, however, Ireland is only one of 27 EU member states which will make final 
determinations on how Brexit impacts Northern Ireland and so even with Ireland’s co-
operation on critical issues like the the movement of goods, services and people across the 
island of Ireland, “[i]t is not a given that the EU will tolerate uncontrolled movement from the 
UK into the EU, via the UK-Irish border.”72  
 
Open Europe has suggested that the border itself is a “red herring”, since the reality of 
immigration control will focus not on border controls but on mechanisms that control access 
to social security benefits and employment which limit the possibility of individuals ‘over-
staying’,73 a point picked up in the UK government’s position paper on Ireland and Northern 
Ireland.74  It seems naïve to imagine the border will not continue to be a prominent feature 
of immigration control but there is truth in the observation that other forms of control will 
impact directly on individual rights to access services (including social security) or secure 
employment, particularly on a cross-border basis, and will be where the lived reality of the 
post-Brexit world takes place. 
 
 
The border: Cross-border working & social security entitlements 
 
There are an estimated 23,000-30,000 cross border workers: those who live in one part of 
Ireland and work in the other.75 This includes UK nationals as well as non-UK and Irish 
                                                      
72 House of Lords European Union Committee, Brexit: UK-Irish Relations, Sixth Report of 2016-
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73 House of Commons Library, The Common Travel Area, and the special status of Irish 
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74 HM Government, Northern Ireland and Ireland: position paper, (2017), para.33, available at 
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75 Centre for Cross Border Studies, EU Reference Briefing Paper 4, 
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nationals. In 2014 the UK issued 17,000 new National Insurance Numbers to Irish nationals 
and the Republic of Ireland issued 15,000 new Personal Public Service Numbers to UK 
nationals.76 For these individuals, the Brexit implications for freedom of movement and the 
exportability of social security benefits (including tax credits and child benefits) will need to 
be understood. 
 
The employment history of cross-border workers evidences high mobility, with workers and 
those who are self-employed in a position to generate social insurance contributions in both 
jurisdictions. The current status of cross-border workers in the EU context means that they 
can aggregate their social insurance contributions to gain entitlement to contributions-based 
social security benefits and pensions, and export certain benefits. The basic rule for cross-
border workers to determine entitlement to family benefits is that income is declared in the 
country of residence rather than the country of work. Two hugely complex tax systems, one 
in each of the jurisdictions, then collaborate to ensure that the right tax is paid so that the 
correct entitlement to tax credits and social security can be determined. Added in to the 
complexity of tax and social security systems is the complexity of individual lives. Entitlement 
to benefits or tax credits will be determined in relation to whether an individual is single or 
married; whether one parent works or both do; whether one/both parents work in the 
same/different jurisdictions; and whether any one of these factors varies over time. 
Regulation (EC) 883/2004 and the implementing Regulation (EC) 987/2009, govern the co-
ordination of social security systems to ensure that movement for the purposes of 
employment does not impact a citizen’s entitlement to social security as s/he moves between 
member states,77 but once again this is a complex framework for a complex regime.78  
 
The removal of this framework would generate greater uncertainty regarding entitlement and 
transportability of benefits and, in social security systems, uncertainty is often detrimental 
for claimants. The Joint Agreement between the EU negotiators and the UK government, 
approved by the EU Council, offers some clarity, but is itself built on much of the uncertainty 
around how EU migrants will be treated post-Brexit. The limitations here concern the 
requirement that EU citizens living in the UK must apply for “settled status” to allow them to 
access acquired EU rights, with an incomplete understanding at this point of how that status 
will be determined or retained.79 Particular gaps emerge for non-economically active EU 
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150217.pdf.  
76 PwC, Brexit: The Implications for Irish Businesses http://www.pwc.ie/media-
centre/assets/publications/2016- pwc-ireland-Brexit-booklet2.pdf. See also N Harris, 
“Demagnetisation of social security and health care for migrants to the UK” (2016) European 
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77 Reg. (EC) 883/2004 does not apply to social assistance benefits 
78 See S Reynolds, “EU citizens living in the UK”, in M Dougan, The UK after Brexit: Legal and 
Policy Challenges (2017, Cambridge: Instersentia) pp 196-198 
79 In particular, there is a lack of clarity over what documentation will be required to prove 
settled status, what the application process will look like, or how the removal of the CJEU’s 
authority will impact on the retention of those rights, and it already seems clear that 
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citizens, and for the children of EU migrant workers, who remain absent from the document’s 
consideration. Irish citizens, however, will not need to apply for settled status and the impact 
of the GFA has meant that individuals in Northern Ireland who are Irish citizens will continue 
to enjoy rights as EU citizens, including where they reside in Northern Ireland.80 Social security 
co-ordination between the UK and the EU is specifically covered by paragraph 28 of the Joint 
Agreement, which provides that Regulations 883/2004 and 987/2009 will apply for Irish 
citizens and those EU citizens who secure “settled status” in the UK, and will include the right 
to aggregate periods of social security insurance. What remains to be established is “a 
mechanism … to decide jointly on the incorporation of future amendments to those 
Regulations in the Withdrawal Agreement.”81 While the future position of other EU nationals 
living, working and/or claiming benefits across the Irish border remains less certain, the 
clearest picture emerges for Irish nationals, currently working and/or receiving benefits in 
either Northern Ireland or Ireland. 
 
There is a further particular issue that relates to access to cross-border services and the 
exportability of benefits, including tax credits, where individuals living in Northern Ireland 
export benefit payments to pay for services in the Republic of Ireland. There is a lack of clarity 
over current protections and inevitably, therefore, a lack of certainty over future protections 
post-Brexit. The issue is highlighted by a recent tribunal of Commissioners’ decision in 
Northern Ireland, NB v HMRC.82 The appellant, NB, was a single parent who was in receipt of 
working tax credits. She lived in county Fermanagh, a border county in Northern Ireland. She 
chose a childcare provider with experience of dealing with her child’s particular needs, which 
was located six miles from her home, with the last half mile of this journey over the border in 
County Cavan in the Republic of Ireland. NB used her child tax credits to pay her childcare 
provider. HMRC made a determination that this was not eligible childcare within the Working 
Tax Credit Regulations 2002 as the provider was located outside the UK.83 Consequently it 
determined that she had been overpaid approximately £20,000 and removed her entitlement 
to tax credits.84 
 
NB argued that HMRC was restricting her freedom to receive services within the EU under 
article 56 TFEU and Directive 2006/123/EC, and that the decision to remove her entitlement 
to tax credits was therefore unlawful. HMRC argued that there was no restriction on NB’s 
                                                      
removal of EU citizens on grounds of criminality goes further than existing protection for 
current EU citizens. 
80 TF50 (2017) 19 – Commission to EU 27, Joint report from the negotiators of the European 
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rights under European law because, within the tax credits legislation, there was a scheme to 
authorise childcare providers outside the UK.  The tribunal of Commissioners disagreed with 
HMRC, finding that the scheme HMRC was referring to was for authorising childcare provision 
on military bases abroad; that the knowledge of the scheme, even among HMRC staff, was 
almost non-existent with the result that it was not accessible or transparent; and that the 
legislative power to authorize childcare providers outside the UK was questionable meaning 
that it was not a valid scheme for this purpose. The decision that the appellant was not 
entitled to tax credits was therefore unlawful, and the Commissioners found that NB was not 
disentitled to tax credits solely on the basis that her childcare provider was located in the 
Republic of Ireland. HMRC is now appealing the decision to the Northern Ireland Court of 
Appeal.  
 
What is significant about this case, however, is that NB’s remedy is directly connected to the 
exercise of her Treaty rights under European law, accessing services over the Irish border. The 
co-ordination of social security benefits and the aggregation of social insurance contributions 
will not assist with this type of case. Nor is it clear that the solution of treating those citizens 
in Northern Ireland who identify as Irish would work: if NB was to be defined as an Irish 
national, as distinct from a British national who will cease to derive these rights from Treaty 
provisions, would HMRC be required to permit her to export her tax credits? Social security 
co-ordination can still be achieved through bilateral agreements between an EU member 
state and third countries but this also creates potential problems. As Reynolds notes: 
 
“Member States willing to reach such an arrangement with the UK will still consider 
the effects of applicable Union principles, such as those arising from the CJEU’s 
Gottardo judgment. Following this decision, an agreement under which, for example, 
Ireland recognises contributions made in the UK when individuals make a claim to its 
social security system, would have to be extended not just to Irish and British nationals 
but also to any EU citizens who have worked in the UK and come to Ireland, with 
potential financial and administrative difficulties for Ireland as a result.”85 
 
Without legal clarity over how future co-ordination of social security systems will work, there 
will still be practical, everyday problems that arise for social security claimants living on or 
near the border, none of which are at the fore of government’s Brexit thinking. 
 
 
The EU’s perspective  
 
The European Commission’s working paper on Essential Principles on Citizens’ Rights provided 
an early statement of the EU’s position. Fundamentally, the Commission has made clear that 
rights stemming from EU citizenship – including social security – should be transformed into 
directly enforceable vested rights under UK law for the life time of those who currently hold 
these rights: 
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“The Withdrawal Agreement should protect the rights of EU27 citizens, UK nationals 
and their family members who, at the date of entry into force of the Withdrawal 
Agreement, have enjoyed rights relating to free movement under Union law, as well 
as rights which are in the process of being obtained and the rights the enjoyment of 
which will intervene at a later date.”86 
 
It has also made clear that the Withdrawal Agreement should protect the rights of EU citizens, 
UK nationals & family members in relation to work and to social security, as set out in 
Regulations 883/2004 and 987/2009, including the right to the aggregation and exportability 
of benefits. While making it clear that these rights, and the derived rights of family members, 
should be protected for life, the Commission also stated that:  
 
“For rights and obligations set out in Regulations 883/2004 and 987/2009 on the 
coordination of social security systems, a mechanism should be established to 
incorporate future amendments to those regulations in the Withdrawal 
Agreement.”87 
 
The EU has defined its position as being based on principles of reciprocity, symmetry and non-
discrimination. The European Commission’s paper on guidelines for the EU27 on the Brexit 
implications for Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland also makes clear that “[t]he 
United Kingdom should ensure that no diminution of rights is caused by the United Kingdom’s 
departure from the European Union, including in the area of protection against forms of 
discrimination currently enshrined in Union law.”88  
 
The UK’s position paper on citizens’ rights was published in June 2017, and proposed a less 
generous approach to the retention of social security rights for EU nationals living in the UK. 
The EU Parliament Brexit Steering Group published a damning response to the UK’s paper, 
stating that the UK does not respect the principles of reciprocity, symmetry and non-
discrimination, raising concerns that “the rights of EU citizens in the UK will be reduced to a 
level lower than third country nationals in the EU” and that requirements to continually prove 
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their settled status amounts to “nothing less than relegation to second class status.”89  The 
UK’s paper does state, however, that it will not alter the Common Travel Area arrangements 
between the UK and Ireland, including “the rights of British and Irish citizens in each others’ 
countries rooted in the Ireland Act 1949”, a commitment now formalised in the Joint 
Agreement.90 While other EU nationals will be required to apply for settled status to protect 
their entitlements, this obligation will not be imposed on Irish citizens residing in the UK. The 
EU paper on citizenship rights does not comment on the potential exemptions for Irish 
nationals, while the UK’s position paper on Northern Ireland and Ireland does not comment 
on EU citizenship rights, focusing only on the citizenship issues flowing from the GFA. The 
coming together all of these disparate parts – EU citizens’ rights, constitutional outworkings 
from the GFA, the mechanisms required to maintain an ‘invisible’ border, the co-ordination 
of different social security and tax systems – is where the lived reality will be for many social 
security claimants and cross-border workers in Northern Ireland, who edge closer to clarity 
but have yet to reach that final point. 
 
 
A joint position? 
 
The EU’s pre-requisite for moving through the Brexit negotiations was that sufficient progress 
would be made on the three priority areas identified by the EU from the outset. Having missed 
the first deadline to demonstrate progress, the UK was under pressure to ensure that an 
agreed position could be reached to allow the EU Council to confirm the completion of phase 
one and a move to phase two. A series of last minute negotiations between the UK and the 
EU – sharply focused on Ireland’s demands for progress on the ‘border question’ and almost 
derailed by objections from the DUP who saw agreement on this issue as a threat to Northern 
Ireland’s position within the UK – finally resulted in a joint report agreed by Prime Minister 
Theresa May and Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker,91 approved by the EU Council 
in December 2017.92 
 
On the question of the Irish border, the Joint Agreement underpins the shared aspiration to 
avoid a ‘hard’ border, which “commits the UK to regulatory alignment with those EU rules 
regarding the single market and the customs union that support not just north-south 
cooperation on the island of the Ireland, but also the “all-island economy” and the protection 
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of the 1998 Good Friday Agreement.”93 What remains to be determined, however, is the legal 
(or political) process by which this regulatory alignment can be achieved, and how the 
constructive ambiguity of the Joint Agreement will simultaneously enable the UK to avoid a 
hard border with Ireland – north-south or east-west – if the UK fulfils its stated aim of leaving 
the single market and the customs union. Both the strength and the weakness of the Joint 
Agreement’s constructive ambiguity means that it is capable of being read differently by 
different political actors. The Irish government has been clear that the Joint Agreement 
provides for the north-south harmonisation required to avoid a hard border.94 The 
Democratic Unionist Party has been publicly reassured that the Joint Agreement does not 
result in any constitutional divergence between Northern Ireland and Great Britain that would 
see an east-west border arise. The UK government position straddles the middle ground, 
simultaneously agreeing with both positions while rejecting the notion that it will have to 
continue to align with Ireland and therefore, in effect, the EU, in order to satisfy both the Joint 
and Good Friday Agreements. In recognising the uncertainty that will ensue from its 
interpretation, the Joint Agreement also makes the border question a specific focus for phase 
two of the negotiations:   
 
“Given the specific nature of issues related to Ireland and Northern Ireland, and on 
the basis of the principles and commitments set out above, both Parties agree that in 
the next phase work will continue in a distinct strand of the negotiations on the 
detailed arrangements required to give them effect.”95 
 
The GFA provides strong precedent on how ‘constructive ambiguity’ can be highly effective, 
but it also evidences the need for political co-operation and strong leadership to make best 
use of such ambiguity. As Hayward and Phinnemore argue, “[e]stablishing the post-Brexit 
arrangements for the island of Ireland will be a process of negotiation. This process is entirely 
dependent not on technical solutions but on political will.96  
 
The voice of Northern Ireland in determining the shape of the Joint Agreement has been 
claimed publicly by the DUP MPs at Westminster. Other (dissenting) voices from Northern 
Ireland have not had (or taken up) the same platform,97 and the absence of a devolved 
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Executive is now a clear weakness in determining Northern Ireland’s constitutional future and 
its relationship with the EU. Within this morass of issues, the devolution of social security – 
already patterned by parity with Britain – and its impact on EU fundamental and Treaty rights 
for EU citizens in Northern Ireland currently exists as a legal fallacy. Given the absence of 
political co-operation on an inter-governmental level there are considerable concerns over 
the level of co-operation that can be achieved with the EU that will, as a consequence, protect 
the rights of social security claimants in Northern Ireland. 
 
The future? 
 
The impact of Brexit on UK social security law is unlikely to generate headlines, or indeed to 
be well understood: shifts in entitlement are more likely to be the unintended, unforeseen 
product of obscure, technical amendments that fall so far under the legislative radar as to be 
invisible to all but those who are directly affected. There is no reassurance at this point that 
the legislative detail will be scrutinised adequately to identify and manage the multiple 
consequential changes that will flow from Brexit, and much concern over a lack of knowledge 
or a lack of accountability determining the complex arrangements that govern social security. 
It may be possible to mount successful arguments to maintain some of the principles on which 
UK social security law has been developed, such as equal treatment and sex discrimination, 
but the prospects of retaining a principle of free movement look slim. National UK concerns 
about the absence of a migrant work-force will likely be oblivious to any consideration of 
whether non-UK nationals can access social security entitlements: social security will not be 
seen as a cure for absent migrant labour, even when it was defined as the problem that 
brought migrant workers to Britain.98 
 
For Northern Ireland, the migrant labour force has a particular profile which includes cross-
border workers. The reciprocity of this arrangement extends to those Northern Ireland 
citizens seeking to work or access services in the Republic of Ireland. The role of fundamental 
rights in Northern Ireland, both in relation to EU law and core human rights principles under 
the ECHR, has been a critical feature of the constitutional and political arrangements that 
have sustained the peace, if not the political stability, in Northern Ireland. Along with the UK 
government, the Republic of Ireland has a role as guarantor of the Good Friday Agreement 
that further underlines the need to agree a Brexit that does not damage economic, social or 
political stability in Northern Ireland, or the underpinning rights. The EU is Ireland’s firm ally 
in this regard, but the potential for protecting rights is diminishing. Any hope that the EU 
Charter on Fundamental Rights would be maintained vanished when the government 
achieved a majority vote on clause 5 in the EU (Withdrawal) Bill to remove the Charter from 
UK law post-Brexit. Other optimistic proposals to use Brexit as an opportunity to implement 
an enforceable Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland would help to bolster the protections for 
social security claimants in Northern Ireland,99 but on their own will not be enough to plug 
the gap left by EU law, a gap that will be too far below the surface to be visible enough to 
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become retained law. Enhanced scrutiny that provides the possibility of looking beneath the 
surface would lend some reassurance that the current corpus of EU law would be fully 
transposed, including the detailed provisions that provide reciprocal access to cross-border 
employment, benefits and services. And operational guarantees that current UK and Irish 
citizens will retain the same rights post-Brexit as they hold now would at least assist in the 
present, if not the future. 
 
The ‘border question’ that was set as a priority by the EU has not been treated as such by the 
UK government. Agreement on progress on this pernicious question constitutes one of the 
biggest political obstacles that could derail the Brexit negotiations, yet in November 2017 – 
less than a month before progress was to be agreed with the EU Council – the House of 
Commons Public Accounts Committee was told that the UK Civil Service Border Planning 
Group had done no work on the border in Ireland.100  It is unsurprising, therefore, that the 
UK’s position on cross-border social security rights remains unclear. The final deal, however, 
will be of critical importance to people living in Northern Ireland, or the Republic of Ireland, 
who are impacted directly by the practical outworking of the UK’s Brexit deal. These citizens 
– Irish, British and other EU migrants – will need to know whether they will be able to hold 
on to their existing rights (never mind take advantage of any future progressive change); 
whether the mechanism to replicate a workable social security co-ordination system will 
enable the exportability and aggregation of such rights in the future; and whether social 
security rules will corral them to only work or access services within the UK to maintain their 
social security entitlements. Judging by HMRC’s decision to appeal NB, the future protection 
of social security rights looks, at best, uncertain and, at worst, detrimental to the reality of 
life for cross-border citizens who face a removal of the existing legal framework of EU rights 
that will impact on fundamental decisions affecting work, financial security, children and 
family life.  
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